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Abstract
The role of macroeconomic policy in the different varieties of capitalism has been large-
ly ignored. Recent contributions to the literature have argued that nonliberal economies 
should be expected to have less accommodating (i.e., less countercyclical) macroeco-
nomic policies than liberal varieties. Using time-series cross-section data on 18 OECD 
countries between 1980 and 2002, this paper tests that hypothesis and, more particularly, 
whether the reaction of discretionary fiscal policy to macroeconomic shocks is condi-
tioned by variables that differentiate liberal from nonliberal varieties of capitalism: the 
degree of generosity of the social protection system, the degree of coordination of wage 
bargaining, and the fragmentation of the political party system. The test results do not 
support the conclusion that nonliberal economies’ macroeconomic policy would be 
less countercyclical than that of liberal economies. On the contrary, discretionary fiscal 
policy has been more countercyclical in countries with a fragmented political system or 
a generous social protection system. 
Zusammenfassung
Die Rolle makroökonomischer Politik in unterschiedlichen kapitalistischen Systemen 
wurde bisher nur selten eingehend untersucht. Eine neuere Argumentation vertritt die 
These, dass die makroökonomische Politik in nichtliberalen Ökonomien weniger anti-
zyklisch ausfällt als in liberalen Ökonomien. Das Papier prüft diese These anhand einer 
gekreuzten Längs- und Querschnittanalyse für 18 OECD-Länder im Zeitraum von 1980 
bis 2002. Dabei widmet es sich im Besonderen der Frage, inwieweit finanzpolitische Re-
aktionen auf makroökonomische Schocks von jenen Variablen beeinflusst werden, die 
liberale von nichtliberalen Ökonomien unterscheiden: die Generosität des Wohlfahrts-
systems, das Ausmaß der Koordinierung von Lohnverhandlungen und der Grad der 
Fragmentierung des Parteiensystems. Das Ergebnis bestätigt die These nicht, sondern 
zeigt, dass eine diskretionäre Fiskalpolitik in jenen Ländern antizyklischer ausfällt, die 
über ein fragmentiertes Parteiensystem oder ein generöses Wohlfahrtssystem verfügen.
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Policy: Are Some Economies More Procyclical Than Others? 
1 Introduction
The varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall/Soskice 2001) differentiates developed 
economies according to a certain number of institutional characteristics: industrial re-
lations, education and vocational training, corporate governance, inter-firm relations 
and intra-firm coordination. It distinguishes two types of capitalism, liberal market 
economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs), which differ not only 
in their institutional features but also in certain macroeconomic characteristics, most 
notably comparative advantage and industrial specialization.
This literature has mainly focused on long-term, slowly-changing institutional differ-
ences between the two archetypal varieties and has paid relatively little attention to 
short-term policies (Amable 2009). Would LMEs and CMEs be clearly distinguishable 
in terms of macroeconomic policy, either budgetary or monetary? In recent contribu-
tions, Soskice (2007), Carlin and Soskice (2009) and Iversen and Soskice (2010) have 
presented some theoretical and empirical elements in favor of a clear differentiation 
between the varieties of capitalism with respect to their aggregate demand manage-
ment regimes (ADMRs). More precisely, they argue that liberal economies such as the 
US would conduct a more accommodating and more countercyclical macroeconomic 
policy than nonliberal capitalist economies such as Germany. Faced with the same ad-
verse macroeconomic shock, a CME would implement a restrictive budget policy in 
order to limit the deficit, whereas an LME would choose an expansionary budget deficit 
to limit the effects of the negative shock on the level of activity or unemployment. This 
differentiation of ADMRs would not be random but would correspond to a systemic re-
quirement for each type of capitalism. Because of the presence of a strong welfare state, 
nonliberal varieties would have built-in automatic stabilizers that would make econom-
ic policy interventions less necessary. Their political systems, based on proportional 
representation and leading to coalition governments, would also make it necessary to 
adopt a rule-based policy instead of using their own discretion, in order to prevent 
soaring deficits and to send a signal to trade unions that wage hikes that could threaten 
competitiveness would not be accommodated by the fiscal or monetary authorities.
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There would thus be some complementarity between the production regimes (which 
can be either liberal or nonliberal), the type of welfare state (generous or limited), the 
nature of the political system (majoritarian or consensual) and the aggregate demand 
management regimes (accommodating or conservative). This complementarity would 
then help to explain why some countries’ macroeconomic policies would react more 
strongly to macroeconomic shocks and be countercyclical, whereas others’ would be 
procyclical. The liberal/nonliberal differentiation of the varieties of capitalism ap-
proach could therefore apply more widely and include the ADMRs: liberal varieties of 
capitalism would imply accommodating macroeconomic policies; nonliberal varieties 
would be associated with conservative policies.
The aim of this paper is to investigate these matters by testing whether one could differ-
entiate the discretionary fiscal policy implemented by developed economies condition-
al on variables characterizing liberal and nonliberal varieties of capitalism. In particular, 
the paper tests how the discretionary component of fiscal policy reacts to macroeco-
nomic shocks, depending on the degree of generosity of the social protection system, 
the fragmentation of the political system, and a transformed indicator of the degree 
of coordination of the wage-bargaining system. These tests are carried out using data 
from a panel of 18 OECD countries for the 1980–2002 period. By inserting interactions 
between the macroeconomic shock and institutional variables, we were able to charac-
terize the differentiated reactions of macroeconomic policy to a given shock according 
to the type of capitalism considered. Contrary to expectations, our results do not show 
that the the fiscal policy of liberal economies would be systematically more accom-
modating than that of nonliberal economies. In fact, a countercyclical policy seems to 
be characteristic of nonliberal varieties of capitalism: the budget policy is expansive in 
the slump and restrictive in the boom. By contrast, the more liberal market economies 
seem to adopt a less countercyclical stance: their fiscal policy is restrictive in the slump 
and expansionary in the boom.
The paper is organized as follows: the section below presents the political economy de-
terminants of budget policy and the argument relating aggregate demand management 
regimes to the varieties of capitalism that are distinguished by their social protection 
and wage-bargaining systems. The section that follows presents the methodology for 
the tests: data sources, variables used, and estimators. Results are then presented in Sec-
tion 4, and their interpretation is discussed. A short conclusion follows.
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2 Macroeconomics and models of capitalism
The political economy of fiscal policy
Recent articles have analyzed the political economy determinants of countries’ fiscal 
policy. There is abundant literature on the causes of government deficits. Roubini and 
Sachs (1989), for example, argue that “weak” or “unstable” governments with multiple 
parties in government, minority status, and/or short terms of office, run larger fiscal 
deficits. Sakamoto (2001) tests the validity of the claim that weak or unstable govern-
ments create larger deficits on a panel of OECD countries and finds some evidence to 
the contrary: that deficits are higher under strong and enduring governments. Saka-
moto’s work shows weak or unstable governments as less capable than strong or stable 
governments of reducing deficits when these have been created or the economy has 
been hit by an adverse shock. He suggests analyzing the fragmentation of the party sys-
tem instead of focusing on the characteristics of governments. Sakamoto’s hypothesis 
is that the number of parties in the party system as a whole may impede the ability of 
governments to balance budgets, rather than affecting the number of parties participat-
ing in the government. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) find that cabinet size and ideol-
ogy are more significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes, and of transfers in 
particular, than coalition size.
Roubini and Sachs (1989) found that multiparty coalition governments characterized 
by a short tenure in office led to higher budget deficits than single-party majoritar-
ian governments. The distinction between proportional representation (PR) and ma-
joritarian electoral rules has become a classic theme of comparative political economy. 
Countries with PR rules are expected to have difficulties reducing public debt (Grilli/
Masciandaro/Tabellini 1991), exhibit higher average tax rates and flatter distributions of 
income (Austen-Smith 2000), carry out more redistributive transfer and greater spend-
ing (Milesi-Ferreti/Perotti/Rostagno 2002), and have larger governments and larger 
welfare programs (Persson/Tabellini 2004) than countries with majority rule. Persson, 
Roland and Tabellini (2007) propose that the link between electoral rules and economic 
policy is indirect and works via party and government formation. PR is associated with 
more fragmented party structures, which in turn lead to more frequent coalition gov-
ernments that then spend more than single-party majority governments.
Partisanship is also expected to play a role in explaining fiscal policy. Following Borrelli 
and Royed (1995), leftist or minority governments run smaller deficits than conserva-
tive or majority governments. Boix (1998) argues that social democratic governments 
avoid budget deficits more often than conservative governments because large defi-
cits would decrease savings and investment and thus endanger democratic supply-side 
economic policy. Garrett (1998), on the other hand, finds that strong left-wing gov-
ernments where strong labor unions are present run larger deficits when the economy 
is subject to the pressures of internationalization (capital mobility and foreign trade). 
Cusack (1999, 2001) argues that the role of partisanship in budget policy does not con-
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form to the simplistic image of a profligate left versus a fiscally conservative right. Par-
tisanship differentiates how budget policy reacts to the business cycle. Parties on the 
left have an interest in fiscal policy being used in Keynesian countercyclical fashion 
because stimulating the economy during recessions helps their constituents, the unem-
ployed, and those likely to bear the greatest risks and costs associated with an economic 
downturn. By carrying out a restrictive policy during booms, left-leaning parties assure 
the government’s ability to respond adequately to future recessions by minimizing the 
build-up of debt and the burden posed by interest payments. Parties on the right tend 
to stimulate fiscal policy in good times by cutting taxes, which favors the most affluent 
voters. In periods of economic downturn, they prefer to run more restrictive policies 
and to counteract the effects of automatic stabilizers, weakening those forces in the 
economy that would push for higher wages. Testing on a panel of OECD countries, 
Cusack (1999, 2001) finds that the left has followed a countercyclical policy. The right 
has acted with lax budget policy during periods of full employment and then with in-
creasing restrictiveness in times of higher unemployment, and has therefore followed a 
procyclical budget policy stance.
Varieties of macroeconomic policy
Recent contributions to the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature have proposed that 
as far as monetary and fiscal policy is concerned, liberal market economies (LMEs) 
such as the US and the UK manage aggregate demand more flexibly than many coordi-
nated market economies (CMEs) such as Germany (Soskice 2007). This fact is not some 
meaningless coincidence, but a reflection of the complementarities between aggregate 
demand management regimes (ADMRs), welfare states, production regimes, and po-
litical systems, as is shown in Table 1 taken from Soskice (2007). 
One may distinguish at least two channels through which ADMRs and production re-
gimes interact: the welfare-state channel and the wage-bargaining system.
Table 1 Complementarities between demand management regimes, political systems, 
welfare states, and production regimes
Production regime Liberal market economy Coordinated market economy
Political system Majoritarian Consensus
Welfare state Liberal Strong
Aggregate demand management 
regime (ADMR)
Discretionary, delegated,  
centralized
Rules-based, negotiated 
contract
Source: Soskice (2007: 90).
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The welfare-state channel
Liberal varieties of capitalism are characterized by a low level of social protection.1 By 
contrast, other types of capitalism (Continental European and Nordic) rely on a welfare 
state that offers considerably more generous protection. Economic reasons may explain 
this difference. Liberal varieties of capitalism base their competitiveness on activities 
that require non-specific skills from workers (Iversen 2005). Because of their general-
ized skills, these workers are expected to be able to find a new job easily in the case that 
they are laid off. Therefore there is no need to protect these skills: workers would not 
demand it, and firms would not find it a significant contribution to their productivity 
or competitiveness. The consequence is that in the varieties of capitalism where gen-
eral skills are widely used, i.e. LMEs, one would expect the level of social protection to 
be relatively low. On the other hand, nonliberal countries’ competitiveness is mostly 
based on activities that require a workforce with firm – or sector-specific skills. In such 
a context, the existence of a generous protection system acts as an ex ante incentive to 
acquire specialized skills. Accordingly, we would expect social protection in CMEs to be 
generous; CMEs should have a “strong welfare state” (Soskice 2007).
This can be extended to the differentiation in political systems. Nonliberal varieties 
of capitalism usually possess consensus-based political systems (Lijphart 1999) where 
support for the government is provided by large coalitions. Those consensual regimes 
then provide a framework for powerful interest groups to take part in policymaking and 
stabilize the alliance between unions and firms in favor of a well-developed welfare state. 
Liberal varieties, on the other hand, are characterized by majoritarian political systems 
that favor the existence of two-party political competition and interest group pluralism 
(Lijphart 1999), with a powerful government facing fragmented social partners, hence 
the limited generosity of the welfare state in LMEs. Moreover, the proportional repre-
sentation system found in consensus-based political systems is considered to favor the 
emergence of a center-left political alliance that is more favorable to the welfare state 
than the center-right alliance found in majoritarian systems (Iversen/Soskice 2006).
The consequences of these differentiated political systems (majoritarian versus consen-
sual) for macroeconomic policy, and more particularly for fiscal policy, are exemplified 
in the “common pool” problem (Soskice 2007; Carlin/Soskice 2009). Indeed, in countries 
with coalition governments, each member of the coalition may be prone to make public 
expenditures in different areas towards the specific groups that support the party. This 
explains the tendency to overspend and to produce excessive deficits because of the given 
levels of government resources (Persson/Tabellini 2004; Persson/Roland/Tabellini 2007).
The existence of such a tendency would make it in the interest of the coalition mem-
bers to have an institutional device that prevents such behavior. The simplest one is to 
1 A limited welfare state also characterizes Asian varieties of capitalism such as Japanese or Korean 
(Amable 2003), which would be considered CMEs in Hall and Soskice’s (2001) classification.
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remove the possibility of discretionary budget policy and establish some rules in order 
to maximize the interests of the coalition. Following this logic, nonliberal countries 
should have strong rules for public expenditures and thereby manage their aggregate 
demand in a non-accommodating way. By contrast, such “discipline” would not be nec-
essary in liberal economies, which could in fact benefit from reactive budget policy as a 
shock-absorbing device.
The wage-bargaining argument
The wage-bargaining argument is based on the consideration of the “small-N” case, that 
is, a small number of large but non-encompassing unions engaged in noncooperative 
wage bargaining. When there is a limited number of independent and non-encompass-
ing unions, as according to Soskice (2007) is the case in some CMEs such as Germany,2 
each of them is big enough to exercise some influence on wage setting. Yet high wages 
could lead to an increased unemployment level.3 If unions have reason to believe that 
an increase in unemployment will lead to a response by the government to counteract 
it, this will decrease their incentives for wage moderation. But if the government aban-
dons the possibility of discretionary fiscal policy, as is the case in Germany, this sharp-
ens the incentives for wage moderation (Carlin/Soskice 2009). Accordingly, CMEs and 
notably Germany should have a non-accommodating aggregate demand management 
regime. By contrast, the possibility of a discretionary fiscal policy has no equivalent ef-
fect in countries with flexible labor markets or with many small independent bargain-
ing units, since wage setters are too small to believe that their actions would have any 
significant impact on the unemployment level and therefore on the government’s fiscal 
policy. Likewise countries with encompassing wage bargainers or countries in which 
bargaining is done in cooperation with the government need not abandon the possibil-
ity of an nonconservative fiscal policy. 
The same argument applies to monetary policy. By raising interest rates, a conservative 
central banker can credibly threaten strong unions to react to wage inflation, leading 
to a contraction of the activity that would threaten employment and thereby changing 
the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. In liberal economies, the central 
bank can be accommodating without fear of unions taking advantage of it (either be-
cause of the unions’ size or because of labor market flexibility) to push for wage hikes. 
Moreover, the economy would benefit from having authorities react quickly to macro-
economic shocks. In fact, there are complementarities in fiscal and monetary policies. A 
conservative monetary policy requires a rules-based fiscal policy for credibility’s sake: a 
lax budget policy would eliminate the threat of a non-accommodating monetary pol-
2 This view could itself be contested: it is commonly acknowledged in industrial relations lit-
erature that the behavior of German trade unions is more cooperative and coordinated than 
noncooperative.
3 High wages could also lead to a higher inflation rate. 
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icy. Nonliberal economies therefore should have both a conservative monetary policy 
and a non-accommodating fiscal policy. Similarly, an accommodating monetary policy 
would see its effects annihilated by a conservative budget policy. Liberal economies 
should then have both a lax budget and an accommodating monetary policy. The con-
sequences for ADMRs are that one should expect nonliberal economies to follow rather 
conservative macroeconomic policies and liberal varieties of capitalism to have accom-
modating ADMRs. The next section tests these predictions for fiscal policy.
3 Methodology
The data
The time-series cross-section data covers the period of 1980–2002 for 18 OECD coun-
tries.4 Variables are either taken from the OECD economic outlook database or from 
various political economy databases (details are given below).
The dependent variable
The link between fiscal policy and economic activity can be fairly complex. In order to 
understand this link better, it is useful to distinguish between the structural and the 
cyclical components of the government’s fiscal balance. Whereas the cyclical balance re-
flects the action of automatic stabilizers, that is, the automatic adjustment of spending 
and revenues to the level of activity, the structural balance measures the discretionary 
level of governments’ policies. One might expect nonliberal economies to have stronger 
automatic stabilizers, for instance more generous unemployment benefits and social se-
curity, than liberal varieties. But the predictions regarding the stance of macroeconomic 
policy mentioned earlier apply to the discretionary component of public expenditures, 
so our focus is on the structural dimension of fiscal policy. To determine this, we use the 
first difference in the Cyclically Adjusted Government Primary Balance as a percentage 
of potential GDP (henceforth CAGPB) as the dependent variable. An accommodating 
fiscal policy can take the form of an increase in expenditures or a cut in taxes. Both mea-
sures would result in a decrease in the budget balance. Although it could be interesting 
to consider expenditure and receipts separately, the focus here is on the budget balance, 
since its evolution reflects both types of expansionary measures.
The source for the CAGPB variable is the 2008 OECD economic outlook. The meth-
odology for building it is briefly described in Appendix A2 and is taken from Girouard 
and André (2005). The CAGPB and its first differences are featured in Figures 1 and 2 
4 The list of countries is given in Appendix A1.
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in the Appendix, respectively. Substantial variation can be noted both across countries 
and over time.
Output gap and the cyclical properties of the level of economic activity
In order to assess whether governments’ discretionary policies are either procyclical or 
countercyclical, it is common practice to link the structural component of the govern-
ment primary balance (expressed as first difference) to the output gap (also expressed 
as first difference: Δ(output_gap); Darby/Melitz 2008). Economies will be considered 
as procyclical (resp. countercyclical) when the evolution of the structural primary bal-
ance and the evolution of the output gap are negatively (resp. positively) related. The 
output gap variable is taken from the 2008 OECD economic outlook and is measured 
as the difference between the levels of observed and potential output: an increase in the 
output gap means an increased GDP growth rate. Shocks are measured by the first dif-
ference in the output gap.
As can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix, the period considered here is one in 
which most countries experienced negative shocks, particularly at the end of the 1980s/
beginning of the 1990s. For some countries (for instance Finland), these shocks have 
been of a very significant magnitude.
Other explanatory variables
The aim of this paper is to relate the type of capitalism that could characterize an econ-
omy to the behavior of that type of capitalism in terms of fiscal policy. Rather than 
take into consideration a binary classification of economies, i.e. CMEs vs. LMEs, which 
increasingly tends to be considered as too restrictive (Amable 2003; Crouch 2005), we 
consider nondichotomous variables that could differentiate between varieties of capi-
talism in several dimensions. The aforementioned arguments that link aggregate de-
mand management regimes to varieties of capitalism refer to the following elements: 
the role of the welfare state in providing incentives for investing in specialized skills, the 
role of electoral rules in favoring center-left or center-right alliances (which will lead 
to a generous or a non-generous welfare state, respectively), and the small-N problem 
in relation to wage bargaining and union strength. In order to take all of these into ac-
count, the empirical analyses presented in what follows will consider an indicator of the 
generosity of the welfare state, the fractionalization of the political system, and the level 
of the wage-bargaining system for each country.
The generosity of the welfare state is measured using Lyle Scruggs’ overall generosi-
ty score, which is an extension of the decommodification index of Esping-Andersen 
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(1990).5 Scruggs’ score is a computation of the net replacement rates of unemployment 
benefits, sickness benefits and pension insurance, the extent of program coverage, and 
its duration. Nonliberal varieties of capitalism have a higher generosity score on average 
than liberal economies.
To account for the differentiation of political systems, a binary opposition between con-
sensus and majoritarian systems is neglected in favor of a more continuous and time-
varying measure. According to the so-called Duverger’s law, proportional representa-
tion leads to more differentiated political competition than the majoritarian system. 
One should therefore expect to see more fractionalized party systems in countries with 
proportional representation than in countries with a majoritarian system. Here, the 
fractionalization of the party system (F) is taken from Armingeon et al. (2004) and 
measured according to the formula of Rae (1967):
 
 (1)
where ti represents the share of votes for party i and m is the number of parties. A higher 
Rae’s index indicates a more fractionalized party system. As expected, nonliberal variet-
ies of capitalism have higher Rae’s index values than do liberal varieties.
Wage bargaining is measured with the version of Kenworthy’s WCoord variable pro-
posed by Visser (2009).6 This is a step variable coded according to the following pattern: 
5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable agreements between the central 
organizations of unions and employers that affect the entire economy or entire private 
sector, or b) the government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling; 4 = mixed 
industry – and economy-wide bargaining: a) central organizations negotiate non-en-
forceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) key unions and employers’ associa-
tions set a pattern for the entire economy; 3 = industry bargaining with irregular or no 
pattern setting, limited involvement of central organizations, and limited freedoms for 
company bargaining; 2 = mixed industry – and firm-level bargaining, with weak en-
forceability of industry agreements; 1 = none of the above bargaining, with fragmented 
bargaining instead, mostly at the company level.
The argument put forward in Carlin and Soskice (2009) regarding the impact of wage 
bargaining echoes that found in Calmfors and Driffill (1988): that one will obtain simi-
lar macroeconomic results when wage bargaining is either completely decentralized/
uncoordinated or completely centralized/coordinated, with intermediate levels usually 
having different consequences for wage and employment levels. In order to express this 
5 The overall generosity score can be found in the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset of 
Lyle Scruggs <http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm>. See also Allan and Scruggs (2004).
6 Visser (2009) relies on the ICTWSS Database: Database on Institutional Characteristics of 
Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 1960 
and 2007.
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idea of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the effect and the level of bargaining, 
and to obtain a new variable, which we will call Visser_trans, the following transforma-
tion is applied to Visser’s WCoord variable :
 Visser_trans = WCoord . (6 – WCoord) (2)
This turns Visser’s variable into an inverted U-shaped pattern. The transformation 
made in the above equation is less flexible than the use of quadratic terms in the origi-
nal WCoord variable but more parsimonious for the estimations, an important element 
to take into account since estimations presented below will use interacting terms.
Controls of the estimated models include dummy variables when there is an election 
(electionyear), in order to detect a possible political business cycle effect; dummies for 
Stages 2 and 3 of the European Monetary Unification (Maastricht2 and Maastricht3), in 
order to control for the effects of convergence criteria on states’ behavior toward fiscal 
policy, and for the German reunification (wende); and the government’s ideological 
position in the left-right spectrum (expressed as a continuous variable), weighted by 
votes (lrgovvotes) or seats (lrgovseats) and calculated by Amable, Gatti and Schumacher 
(2006) using information from the Cusack and Engelhardt (2002) database, itself built 
upon the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001). This variable, which could 
theoretically vary between – 100 and +100, is negative for left-wing coalitions and posi-
tive for right-wing governments, and increasingly so when governments are more par-
tisan. A variable measuring the degree of independence of the central bank (CBindep) 
is also used, based on Freitag (1999) and commented on by Armingeon et al. (2004). 
This is a composite index constructed out of four other indicators; it ranges from 1 to 3, 
where 1 stands for a maximum of central bank independence.
The estimated relationship
Summing up the arguments relative to the differentiation of macroeconomic policy, a 
country’s aggregate demand management regime should be less accommodating when 
that country has a generous social protection system, a fragmented political system (a 
political system where there are numerous political parties), and an intermediate-level 
wage-bargaining system (large but non-encompassing unions). The econometric speci-
fication for the tests is the following:
 d = a1 · s + a2 · x +a12 · s · x + β · Z + ε (3)
d is the measure of the discretion of the fiscal policy, s is a macroeconomic shock, x 
is a variable representing a structural feature of the country (the generosity of its so-
cial protection system, the extent of the political system fragmentation, or the level of 
wage bargaining), and Z is a vector of additional controls that also includes time – and 
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country-fixed effects. In a specification containing such interactions, the effect of the 
shock on fiscal policy depends on the level of the structural variable x. The overall effect 
of this shock on fiscal policy is given by: 
  (4)
One can then compute the marginal effects of the shock on fiscal policy for different 
levels of the structural variable x and draw the respective conclusions about the pro-
cyclical or countercyclical nature of nonliberal and liberal varieties of capitalism. An 
adverse macroeconomic shock (a negative s) will lead the government to increase the 
discretionary component of the budget balance if there is a desire in government to 
act countercyclically and dampen the effects of the shock on activity or employment. 
Such an increase should lead to a more negative or less positive budget balance. A gov-
ernment acting procyclically, on the other hand, will cut the discretionary component. 
A large positive marginal effect, computed as in equation [4], will therefore signal a 
strongly countercyclical behavior, whereas a negative marginal effect will characterize a 
procyclical budget policy.
On the basis of the arguments expressed above, budget policy should be less countercy-
clical when the varieties of capitalism are less liberal. One expects then that the margin-
al effect will decrease with the generosity of the welfare state, the degree of “consensus” 
of the political system, and the intensity of the small-N problem on wage bargaining.
The estimators used 
In order to estimate relation (3), we first used the panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) estimator7 of Beck and Katz (1995). Whereas the panel data structure is gener-
ally characterized by a large number of individuals and a small number of time periods, 
time-series cross-section (henceforth TSCS) data rely on a small number of individuals, 
as is the case in our sample encompassing only 18 countries, hence our use of this PCSE 
estimator. Moreover, two kinds of problems may arise because of the data structure: 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlations of the error terms. The PCSE es-
timator provides parameter estimates based on OLS regressions, but when computing 
the standard errors and the variance-covariance matrix, it assumes that the error terms 
are heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated and correct for these features.
However, the shock variable s (Δ[output_gap]) should be considered as endogenous 
since discretionary fiscal policy is used in order to affect it. Moreover, since the 
Δ(out put_gap) variable enters our interaction term, the interaction term itself is also 
7 Relation (3) was also estimated with a fixed effect estimator but none of the results obtained 
with the PCSE estimator were changed.
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endogenous. To cope with this endogeneity, we estimated relation (3) a second time 
with the help of an IV estimator. In order to use an estimator with a certain degree of 
robustness vis-à-vis the problems of weak instruments and finite sample bias, the con-
tinuously updated GMM estimator of Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996) was preferred 
to the standard two-stage least squares estimator. The continuous updated estimator 
(CUE) is “the GMM-like generalization of the limited maximum likelihood” (LIML) 
estimator (Hausman et al. 2007) and generates coefficient estimates that are efficient in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity.8
4 Results
The estimations made with the PCSE estimator are presented first, as a benchmark. The 
GMM estimations follow.
PCSE results
The results for the estimations using the indicator of generosity of the social protection 
system are presented in Table 2. A few control variables are significant: a more inde-
pendent central bank is associated with a less accommodating fiscal policy, suggesting 
a complementarity between fiscal and monetary policy. As predicted in theories of the 
political business cycle, the election years are characterized by a larger budget deficit. 
The positive coefficient on the partisan variable (lrgovvotes) signals that left-wing gov-
ernments have larger deficits or smaller surpluses than right-wing governments.
The most interesting results concern the terms where interactions have been inserted, 
however. The marginal effect of the macroeconomic shock according to the level of gen-
erosity of the social system can be read in the lower panel of Table 3. Marginal effects 
and their standard errors are computed for the minimum (em_min), mean (em_mean), 
and maximum levels (em_max) of generosity of our sample as well as for one standard 
deviation of the level of the interacted variable around the mean (em_mean_less_1sd 
and em_mean_plus_1sd).
One can see that the marginal effect of a given macroeconomic shock on the discretionary 
change in fiscal policy increases with the generosity of the social protection system. The 
marginal effect is negative for low levels of social protection, although not significant from 
zero in any estimations, and turns progressively positive and significant as one reaches the 
8 Tests with GMM and LIML estimators were also performed but are not reported in what fol-
lows. The general conclusion of our results was not altered.
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maximum level of protection. This means that fiscal policy can be considered as neutral 
(i.e. neither pro – nor countercyclical) for low to mean values of the index of generosity, 
and increasingly countercyclical when countries have more generous social protection.
If anything, according to the arguments presented in Section 2.2, the opposite result 
should have been obtained. The results presented in Table 2 show that nonliberal econ-
omies are more countercyclical than liberal economies.
To check the robustness of the result, tests were performed using the degree of fraction-
alization of the political party system (Table 3) and the transformed wage-bargaining 
coordination indicator (Table 4). The results are disappointing, since no significant 
marginal effect can be found for either interacted variable. This does not allow us to 
draw any conclusions about the influence of the nonliberal or liberal character of an 
economy on fiscal policy.
Table 2 Estimation results with Scruggs’ generosity indicator (dependent variable: DCAGPB)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
D(output_gap) –0.374** –0.417** –0.391** –0.378** –0.388** –0.371* –0.348* –0.349*
(0.175) (0.185) (0.185) (0.189) (0.187) (0.191) (0.191) (0.189)
scrugg_ogs –0.052 –0.050 –0.034 –0.035 –0.034 –0.031 –0.021 –0.021
(0.049) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
D(output_gap) x 0.015** 0.016** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.014** 0.014**
scrugg_ogs (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
lrgovvotes – 0.010** – 0.010** 0.010* 0.013** 0.010* 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
lrgovseats – – 0.010* – – – – –
(0.005)
CBindep – – –0.500** – –0.506** – –0.533*** –0.534***
(0.202) (0.202) (0.200) (0.200)
electionyear – – – –0.552*** – –0.538*** –0.567*** –0.567***
(0.158) (0.158) (0.157) (0.157)
WCoord – – – – –0.010 0.024 –0.006 –
(0.113) (0.114) (0.113)
maastricht2 – – – – – –0.791* – –
(0.462)
maastricht3 – – – – – –0.146 – –
(0.640)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
number of observations 366 339 339 337 339 337 337 337
individuals 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
R² 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.30
Marginal effects
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
em_min –0.120 –0.132 –0.122 –0.114 –0.121 –0.109 –0.101 –0.102
(0.082) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086)
em_mean_less_1sd –0.068 –0.078 –0.070 –0.063 –0.070 –0.059 –0.055 –0.055
(0.068) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071)
em_mean 0.042 0.049 0.049 0.054 0.049 0.058 0.055 0.055
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.058) (0.060) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
em_mean_plus_1sd 0.152* 0.175** 0.168** 0.171** 0.167** 0.174** 0.164** 0.164**
(0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.083) (0.085) (0.084) (0.082) (0.083)
em_max 0.287** 0.326** 0.311** 0.311** 0.309** 0.313** 0.294** 0.295**
(0.134) (0.135) (0.135) (0.134) (0.134) (0.136) (0.133) (0.134)
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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IV GMM estimation results
In order to take into account the effect of fiscal policy on a country’s level of activity, 
i.e., to address the endogeneity problem of the macroeconomic shock variable, we now 
turn to an instrumental-variable (IV) estimator. The results of the estimations using 
instrumental variables are presented in Tables 5 through 7. The output gap and the in-
teracted variables are considered endogenous and are instrumented with their lags, the 
index of fractionalization of the party system and the lagged debt over GDP ratio. The 
tests for the validity of instruments are presented in the tables: overidentifying restric-
tions (Sargan-Hansen J-statistic), underidentification (LM test), endogenous regressors 
(Anderson-Rubin test), and weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap statistic).
Table 5 presents the estimation results obtained using the index of generosity as an in-
teracted variable. The effect of control variables changes little in comparison to PCSE 
Table 3 Estimation results with Rae’s party-fractionalisation indicator  
(dependent variable: D CAGPB)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
D(output_gap) –0.435 –0.496 –0.482 –0.405 –0.462 –0.448 –0.372 –0.393
(0.327) (0.347) (0.350) (0.339) (0.351) (0.342) (0.343) (0.342)
rae –0.031 –0.046* –0.047* –0.036 –0.045 –0.029 –0.034 –0.036
(0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
D(output_gap) x rae 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Irgovvotes – 0.011** – 0.011** 0.011* 0.012* 0.010* 0.011**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Irgovseats – – 0.011** – – – – –
(0.006)
CBindep – – –0.400** – –0.399** – –0.392** –0.402**
(0.201) (0.199) (0.200) (0.202)
electionyear – – – –0.488*** – –0.481*** –0.493*** –0.492***
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
Visser_Coord – – – – –0.074 –0.048 –0.076 –
(0.111) (0.109) (0.111)
maastricht2 – – – – – –0.755 – –
(0.476)
maastricht3 – – – – – –0.077 – –
(0.637)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
number of observations 409 372 372 370 372 370 370 370
individuals 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
R² 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.27
Marginal effects
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
em_min –0.122 –0.136 –0.132 –0.104 –0.126 –0.117 –0.095 –0.101
(0.113) (0.121) (0.122) (0.120) (0.123) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121)
em_mean_less_1sd –0.030 –0.032 –0.032 –0.018 –0.030 –0.023 –0.016 –0.018
(0.066) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071)
em_mean 0.025 0.031 0.029 0.034 0.029 0.035 0.033 0.033
(0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059)
em_mean_plus_1sd 0.080 0.094 0.090 0.086 0.087 0.093 0.081 0.083
(0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.072) (0.075) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072)
em_max 0.129 0.151 0.145 0.134 0.141 0.146 0.125 0.130
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.098) (0.102) (0.101) (0.098) (0.098)
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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estimates: the political business cycle effect is still present, and left-wing governments, 
on average, are associated more with larger deficits or smaller surpluses than are right-
wing governments. The most interesting changes take place with the marginal effects. 
The generosity of the welfare state makes fiscal policy more countercyclical, as is shown 
in the lower panel of Table 5 by the positive relationship between the marginal effect of 
the shock and the value of the indicator. But the signs of the coefficients indicate that 
countries with a non-generous social protection system (i.e., liberal varieties of capital-
ism) are procyclical, whereas nonliberal countries with a generous social protection sys-
tem are countercyclical; this result is robust to changes in the control variables and the 
instrumentation. Besides this, the marginal effects at both ends of the generosity-score 
distribution are in general significant. Our conclusion is therefore that contrary to ex-
pectations, nonliberal economies’ fiscal policy is significantly countercyclical, whereas 
liberal economies’ policy is at best neutral and more likely procyclical. This result also 
holds if we use the index of party-system fractionalization instead of the generosity of 
the state variable (Table 6) and in addition to the level of wage bargaining variable. In 
Table 4 Estimation results with the transformed Visser indicator  
(dependent variable: DCAGPB)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
D(output_gap) 0.092 0.042 0.065 0.052 0.065 0.041 0.075
(0.182) (0.191) (0.192) (0.189) (0.192) (0.189) (0.190)
Visser_trans 0.053 0.065 0.047 0.068 0.046 0.068 0.048
(0.073) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076) (0.078)
D(output_gap) x Visser_trans –0.011 –0.003 –0.006 –0.004 –0.006 –0.002 –0.007
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Irgovvotes – 0.009 – 0.009* 0.009* 0.011* 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Irgovseats – – 0.009* – – – –
(0.005)
CBindep – – –0.387* – –0.393* – –0.389*
(0.203) (0.203) (0.203)
electionyear – – – –0.542*** – –0.531*** –0.545***
(0.151) (0.151) (0.150)
maastricht2 – – – – – –0.778* –
(0.458)
maastricht3 – – – – – –0.028 –
(0.612)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
number of observations 409 372 372 370 372 370 370
individuals 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
R2 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.26
Marginal effects
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
em_min 0.038 0.028 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.031 0.041
(0.077) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.077) (0.079)
em_mean_less_1sd 0.032 0.026 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.038
(0.069) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.072) (0.070) (0.071)
em_mean 0.015 0.022 0.021 0.027 0.021 0.027 0.027
(0.059) (0.061) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.059) (0.060)
em_mean_plus_1sd –0.002 0.017 0.011 0.021 0.011 0.023 0.015
(0.074) (0.077) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076)
em_max –0.004 0.016 0.009 0.020 0.009 0.023 0.014
(0.077) (0.081) (0.081) (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080)
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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this latter case, liberal economies are neutral and therefore not procyclical, whereas 
non-liberal economies are countercyclical (Table 7).
The results presented in the above tables are in sharp contrast to the conclusions of 
Soskice (2007) and Carlin and Soskice (2009). One would have expected the absence 
of generous social protection in liberal varieties of capitalism to be compensated by 
strongly countercyclical macroeconomic policy, particularly fiscal policy, in order to 
limit the impact of macroeconomic shocks. But the estimations show that nonliberal 
varieties of capitalism are more countercyclical than liberal varieties, indicating that 
Table 5 Estimation (IV) results with Scruggs’ generosity indicator  
(dependent variable: DCAGPB)
3 4 5 6 7
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
D(output_gap) –2.040*** –1.410*** –2.425*** –2.420*** –2.674***
(0.730) (0.493) (0.686) (0.702) (0.769)
int_D(output_gap) x scrugg_ogs 0.069*** 0.060*** 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.094***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024)
scrugg_ogs –0.075 –0.107* –0.046 –0.060 –0.084
(0.060) (0.055) (0.052) (0.054) (0.066)
Irgovvotes 0.012* – – – 0.014*
(0.007) (0.008)
CBindep – – – –0.070 –0.326
(0.239) (0.274)
WCoord – – – 0.037 0.162
(0.135) (0.146)
electionyear –0.434** –0.687*** –0.391** –0.446** –0.393*
(0.188) (0.177) (0.197) (0.197) (0.218)
wende 0.471 0.396 0.593 0.810
(0.541) (0.524) (0.584) (0.593)
maastricht2 –0.479 –0.771** –0.476 –0.705* –0.832*
(0.350) (0.348) (0.383) (0.413) (0.429)
maastricht3 0.070 –0.548 0.020 –0.143 –0.421
(0.493) (0.474) (0.473) (0.509) (0.538)
rae – – – 0.049 –0.003
(0.041) (0.046)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
number of observations 291 279 310 310 283
p-value of Hansen J-statistic 0.240 0.106 0.136 0.127 0.174
p-value of underidentification LM statistic 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value of Anderson-Rubin  
F-test of endogenous regressors 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value of Anderson-Rubin chi-sq test  
of endogenous regressors 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-statistic for weak identification  
(Cragg-Donald or Kleibergen-Paap) 5.563 4.115 6.519 6.088 5.387
Marginal effects
em_min –0.832** –0.366 –0.922*** –0.889*** –1.031***
 (0.350) (0.235) (0.337) (0.341) (0.370)
em_mean_less_1sd –0.594** –0.160 –0.618** –0.579** –0.727**
 (0.281) (0.193) (0.274) (0.276) (0.302)
em_mean –0.062 0.297** 0.033 0.083 0.001 
 (0.156) (0.140) (0.176) (0.175) (0.175)
em_mean_plus_1sd 0.470*** 0.755*** 0.683*** 0746*** 0.728***
 (0.174) (0.181) (0.196) (0.200) (0.197)
em_max 1.100*** 1.302*** 1.482*** 1.560*** 1.597***
 (0.341) (0.299) (0.345) (0.356) (0.371)
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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social protection and countercyclical policies are more complementary than substitute 
to one another. Stability and robustness tests were performed by restricting the time 
period or dropping one country from the sample at a time. The detailed results are 
not reported here, but the conclusion is that the link between the nonliberal character 
of the varieties of capitalism and the countercyclical position of the budget policy are 
robust to changes in the sample considered.
Table 6 Estimation (IV) results with Rae’s party-fractionalisation indicator  
(dependent variable: DCAGPB)
1 2 3 4 5
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
D(output_gap) –6.283*** –4.757*** –8.827*** –7.975*** –6.135***
(2.420) (1.672) (2.547) (2.393) (1.791)
D(output_gap) x rae 0.079** 0.067*** 0.122*** 0.111*** 0.086***
(0.031) (0.023) (0.035) (0.032) (0.024)
rae –0.114** –0.011 0.040 0.040 0.019
(0.057) (0.030) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033)
Irgovvotes 0.013 0.017** – – 0.015*
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
CBindep –0.351 – – –0.290 –0.588**
(0.339) (0.273) (0.258)
WCoord 0.232 – – 0.029 0.097
(0.214) (0.165) (0.162)
openc 0.088** – – – –
(0.044)
vetoplayers –0.346** – – – –
(0.171)
electionyear –0.062 –0.274 –0.140 –0.157 –0.202
(0.276) (0.188) (0.232) (0.219) (0.203)
wende 0.609 0.513 0.735 1.064*
(0.652) (0.528) (0.573) (0.576)
maastricht2 – –0.889*** –1.224*** –1.286*** –1.423***
(0.336) (0.432) (0.435) (0.410)
maastricht3 – –0.239 –0.299 –0.498 –1.110**
(0.488) (0.565) (0.574) (0.547)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
number of observations 248 320 349 349 312
p-value of Hansen J-statistic 0.160 0.648 0.288 0.302 0.250
p-value of underidentification LM statistic 0.017 0.034 0.014 0.021 0.019
p-value of Anderson-Rubin F-test  
of endogenous regressors 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value of Anderson-Rubin chi-sq test  
of endogenous regressors 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-statistic for weak identification  
(Cragg-Donald or Kleibergen-Paap) 2.386 2.591 2.592 2.426 2.772
Marginal effects
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
em_min –1.872** –1.415*** –2.698*** –2.415*** –1.845***
(0.728) (0.546) (0.826) (0.780) (0.595)
em_mean_less_1sd –0.974** –0.428* –0.866** –0.753** –0.597**
(0.432) (0.233) (0.346) (0.328) (0.267)
em_mean –0.422 0.143 0.187 0.203 0.133
(0.317) (0.124) (0.200) (0.184) (0.141)
em_mean_plus_1sd 0.129 0.713*** 1.241*** 1.158*** 0.864***
(0.329) (0.228) (0.373) (0.342) (0.231)
em_max 0.785 1.236*** 2.223*** 2.049*** 1.557***
(0.491) (0.389) (0.626) (0.579) (0.404)
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Interpretation of the results
The above estimation results have shown that contrary to expectations, the discretion-
ary fiscal policy in nonliberal economies can be characterized as rather countercyclical, 
whereas liberal economies’ policy stance is at best neutral and more likely procyclical. 
Interpreting these results implies going beyond a functionalist viewpoint, according to 
which institutions and macroeconomic policy stance would complement one another 
in order to achieve some ex-ante determined coherence in macroeconomic dynamics 
and focus on the coherence of the macroeconomic policy with respect to the political 
objectives of policy makers. At the simplest interpretation level, policies are implement-
ed by governments in order for the governments to be reelected. More generally, mac-
roeconomic policy is a means to find a mediation between conflicting interest groups 
Table 7 Estimation (IV) results with the transformed Visser indicator  
(dependent variable: DCAGPB)
b/se b/se
D(output_gap) –0.924 –0.481
(0.674) (0.670)
D(output_gap) x Visser_trans 0.172* 0.125
(0.089) (0.089)
Visser_trans –0.018 0.008
(0.093) (0.090)
electionyear –0.601*** –0.599***
(0.161) (0.164)
Wende –0.381 0.045
(0.601) (0.631)
maastricht2 – –1.040***
(0.332)
maastricht3 – –0.815*
(0.458)
year dummies Yes Yes
number of observations 308 308
p-value of Hansen J-statistic 0.137 0.126
p-value of underidentification LM statistic 0.001 0.002
p-value of Anderson-Rubin F-test 
of endogenous regressors 0.009 0.004
p-value of Anderson-Rubin chi-sq test  
of endogenous regressors 0.004 0.001
F-statistic for weak identification  
(Cragg-Donald or Kleibergen-Paap) 3.777 3.293
Marginal effects
b/se b/se
em_min –0.064 0.145
(0.252) (0.250)
em_mean_less_1sd –0.007 0.186
(0.227) (0.225)
em_mean 0.271** 0.388***
(0.137) (0.136)
em_mean_plus_1sd 0.548*** 0.590***
(0.166) (0.166)
em_max 0.623*** 0.645***
cyclica (0.192) (0.192)
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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and ensure that the government obtains the political support necessary for its stability. 
The results presented in this paper suggests that there may exist a systematic correlation 
between the possibility for a government to find successful political mediation with the 
help of a procyclical (resp. countercyclical) budget policy, and the liberal (resp. nonlib-
eral) character of the economic and political institutions of the country. The exact defi-
nition of the complementarities involved is a task that exceeds the limits of the present 
article. However, some elements may be given.
The very same reasons that explain why nonliberal economies may be expected to have 
more generous welfare states than liberal economies may help us to understand why 
nonliberal economies’ fiscal policy is countercyclical and liberal economies’ macroeco-
nomic policy is not. A key interest group in nonliberal economies is that of skilled work-
ers who invest in specific assets (Iversen 2005). As argued earlier, these workers are more 
likely to experience difficulties finding a new job in the case of layoffs. Such layoffs will 
of course be more probable in times of recession, when the value of the (co-)specific 
assets decreases. In such periods, a reflationary policy would be in the interest not only 
of workers, but also of firms. Key coalition agents would thus favor implementing a fis-
cal expansionary policy, which would then be a complement to, rather than a substitute 
for, a generous welfare state. By boosting employment and GDP in times of recession, 
a countercyclical fiscal policy would make a generous welfare state more sustainable in 
both economic and political terms.
One could also go back to Kalecki’s (1943) seminal analysis of the determinants of em-
ployment-sustaining macroeconomic policies in the business cycle. Following Kalecki, 
business leaders have an interest in curbing wage inflation and will press for an orthodox 
macroeconomic policy when the economy is at near-full employment. Kalecki argues 
that rentiers and capitalists form a successful coalition against workers in the full employ-
ment phase of the cycle, and ally with workers to press for a reflationary policy in the 
slump. The stability of the rentier-capitalist political alliance may be considered to be 
more durable in liberal economies with majoritarian political systems (Iversen/Soskice 
2006). This may explain why the worker-capitalist coalition fails to emerge even during 
the slump. A favorable macroeconomic environment is therefore more likely to be used to 
implement fiscal measures favorable to the upper and upper-middle range of the income 
distribution, and the slump will be an opportunity to slash social expenditures in order to 
fight the deficit in public finance. Budget policy in the liberal varieties of capitalism would 
thus exhibit a procyclical character, favoring activity in the boom phase and deepening 
recession in the slump. These results are in line with those of Cusack (1999, 2001).
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5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the nature of the relationship between the reaction to macro-
economic shocks in discretionary fiscal policy and the type of capitalism in a country. It 
has recently been proposed in the VoC literature that liberal market economies would be 
expected to follow accommodating macroeconomic policies, whereas nonliberal variet-
ies would adopt a more conservative stance. Using different indicators to distinguish va-
rieties of capitalism, we carried out tests to determine the pro – or countercyclical nature 
of discretionary fiscal policy for a panel of 18 OECD countries over the past two decades.
Our results show that liberal market economies’ fiscal policies are either neutral or pro-
cyclical, whereas nonliberal economies adopt a countercyclical stance. This means that 
nonliberal varieties of capitalism adopt a restrictive fiscal policy in the boom phase, 
which is compatible with Soskice (2007)’s prediction. On the other hand, the budget 
policy of nonliberal varieties of capitalism is reflationary in the slump. More liberal 
varieties adopt a mildly expansionary policy in the boom phases and a restrictive policy 
in the recession phases. The results are robust with respect to the consideration of dif-
ferent indicators of differentiation of the type of capitalism, the inclusion of control 
variables, the use of different estimators and, to a large extent, a change in the time pe-
riod and country sample considered. The complementarity between budget policy and 
the institutions of capitalism thus appears to differ according to the type of capitalism. 
These findings suggest that the differentiation of capitalism is not limited to formal 
rules such as employment legislation, corporate governance, or competition law, but is 
also expressed in different types of macroeconomic policy. Furthermore, the evidence 
points in the direction of a differentiation, placing features such as proportional rep-
resentation, predominance of left-wing coalitions, institutions characteristic of non-
liberal capitalism, and Keynesian-type countercyclical budget policy in opposition to 
features such as majoritarian election rules, predominance of right-wing governments, 
institutions characteristic of liberal market capitalism, and procyclical budget policy. 
Further research is needed to determine whether these relationships have changed as a 
result of the financial and economic crisis that hit developed economies in 2007–2008 
and led to significant government action to avoid a systemic crisis of the banking sys-
tem and an economic depression.
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Appendix
A1 Countries of the sample
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.
A2 The OECD methodology
In order to build their CAGPB variable, Girouard and André (2005) rely on the follow-
ing methodology. They start by presenting all the sources of government revenues taken 
into account in the OECD economic outlook dataset. Four kinds of revenues are distin-
guished: personal income tax, social security contributions, corporate income tax, and 
indirect taxes. On the spending side, only unemployment-related transfers are expected 
to be cyclical. The CAGPB variable is then equal to:
    (5)
Where:
G* = cyclically adjusted current primary government expenditures
T*i  = cyclically adjusted component of the i-th category of tax
X = non-tax revenues minus capital and net interest spending
Y * = level of potential output
Where the cyclically adjusted components are computed according to relations (A2) 
and (A3):
  (6)
  (7)
Where:
T* = actual tax revenues for the i-th category of tax
G = actual current primary government expenditures  
(excluding capital and interest spending)
Y = level of actual output
U* = level of structural unemployment
U  = level of actual unemployment
εti.y = elasticity of the i-th tax category with respect to the output gap
εg.u = elasticity of current primary government expenditures with respect  
to the ratio of structural to actual unemployment.
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Girouard and André (2005) show that the elasticities can be split into two components: 
an elasticity of each of the taxes mentioned above with respect to the appropriate tax 
base, and an elasticity of the tax base relative to the output gap. Whereas the first elas-
ticity is drawn from tax legislation and related fiscal data, the second one is estimated 
using both time-series regressions and panel-estimation technique (for a detailed pre-
sentation, see Girouard/André 2005).
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